Paraconsistency?

I'm wrestling with the ideas of paraconsistent logics and dialetheism (for my sins). In his essay for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Graham Prest gives the following example:

2.1.1 Non-Trivial Theories

Examples of inconsistent but non-trivial theories are easy to produce. One example can be derived from the history of science. Consider Bohr’s theory of the atom. According to this, an electron orbits the nucleus of the atom without radiating energy. However, according to Maxwell’s equations, which formed an integral part of the theory, an electron which is accelerating in orbit must radiate energy. Hence, Bohr’s account of the behaviour of the atom was inconsistent. Yet, patently, not everything concerning the behavior of electrons was inferred from it, nor should it have been. Hence, whatever inference mechanism it was that underlay it, this must have been paraconsistent (Brown & Priest 2015).

Priest concludes that Bohr's account of the behaviour of the atom was inconsistent and that the logic of his account must have been paraconsistent. There is a much better way of describing this situation. And it is this:

Bohr was wrong

We don't need to do anything clever, here. Bohr was simply wrong to think of the atom as a particle orbiting a nucleus. And Priest clearly understands why this was wrong - an accelerating electron gives off electromagnetic radiation. Since this is not what happens in an atom, Bohr was wrong. He was not using an alternative form of logic, he made a mistake (one of many). 

We don't have to dignify an error by giving it a fancy name. Bohr was a man of enormous charisma who did make some important contributions to physics, but who also convinced a lot of people to believe nonsense. This isn't a new form of logic, it is a delusion.